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ARTICLE

The Margin of Appreciation in International
Investment Law
JULIAN ARATO*

Investment treaties tend to say nothing, or only very little, about the appropriate standard of review for arbitrating disputes between sovereign states and
foreign investors. Most treaties do not address whether states should be afforded
any deference in their own assessment of their treaty obligations. Neither do
they specify the converse, that state action must be strictly reviewed. They are
simply silent — and their silence has been interpreted in innumerable ways by
different tribunals. This interpretive chaos has generated calls for a unified approach — one that would resolve the uncertain and fragmented status quo,
while being sufficiently flexible as to admit the application of different standards of review in different contexts. To some, the venerable doctrine of the margin of appreciation appears to fit just this bill — a solution finding growing favor among tribunals and commentators, not to mention advocates for respondent
states.
This Article challenges the suitability of the margin of appreciation in the
adjudication of investment disputes. This judge-made doctrine is famously a
product of Strasbourg, manufactured by the European Court of Human
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Law (Nov. 1–2, 2013), as well as Jason Yackee, Elizabeth Trujillo, and the participants in the Inaugural ASIL IEcLIG Junior Scholars Research Forum, University of Pennsylvania (Nov. 22, 2013) for
comments on this piece — and likewise to Bart Szewczyk, Claudia Haupt, and the participants in the
joint ASIL–ASCL International and Comparative Junior Scholars Workshop, Columbia Law School
(Mar. 29, 2013). Thanks, finally, to Brian King, Elliot Friedman, Rahim Moloo, Carlos RamosMrosovsky, Erik Lindemann, and Julianne Marley. Of course all views contained herein, as well as
any errors or omissions, are solely my own.

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2319559
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319559

546

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 54:3

Rights. Its halting import into the global investment regime is only a recent phenomenon. Through comparison to the Strasbourg Court, I suggest that certain
key grounds for affording the margin in its original context do not obtain within
investment law — calling into question the doctrine’s propriety in its new setting.
Beyond questioning the suitability of the margin of appreciation within ad
hoc investment disputes, this Article challenges the broader premise that the
problem of fragmented approaches to the standard of review among investment
tribunals can be best resolved through judicial recourse to a unified a priori
doctrine of deference. As evidenced by the adventures of the margin in several
recent arbitral awards, such attempts tend to produce only a pernicious illusion
of unity. I argue, instead, that the desired certainty can be achieved only gradually, through judicial practice and dialogue over the medium to long term.
Introduction ........................................................................................................546
I.
The Margin in Investment Law ...........................................................553
A.
Deference and the Standard of Review ..................................554
B.
Recourse to the Margin of Appreciation ................................559
II.
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III. Deference and Dialogue .......................................................................571
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INTRODUCTION
Investment treaties tend to say nothing, or only very little, about the appropriate standard of review for arbitrating disputes between sovereign
states and foreign investors. Most treaties do not address whether or to
what extent states should be afforded a degree of deference in their own
assessment of their treaty obligations, or their agencies’ findings of fact;
and neither do they specify the converse, that state action must be strictly
reviewed, or state fact-finding subject to de novo scrutiny. They are simply
silent, and their silence has been interpreted in innumerable ways by different tribunals. This emergent interpretive chaos has, unsurprisingly, generated calls for a unified approach — one that would resolve the uncertain
and fragmented status quo, while being sufficiently flexible as to admit the
application of different standards of review in different contexts. To
some, the venerable doctrine of the margin of appreciation appears to fit
just this bill — a solution finding growing favor among tribunals and
commentators, not to mention advocates for respondent states.
This Article questions the propriety of the margin of appreciation in
the context of the ad hoc resolution of investment disputes. In so doing, it
challenges the broader premise that the problem of fragmented approaches to the standard of review can be best resolved through judicial recourse
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to a unified a priori doctrine of deference, no matter how flexible. The
problem cannot be solved all at once — at least not through judicial action
under current institutional arrangements. And as evidenced by the adventures of the margin in investment awards to date, attempts to do so are
more likely than not to produce only a pernicious illusion of unity. I suggest, instead, that the desired certainty can be achieved only gradually,
through judicial dialogue over the medium to long term — among investor-state tribunals, and extending no less to other international courts and
tribunals grappling with similar problems.
The margin of appreciation is a judge-made doctrine of deference —
famously a product of Strasbourg, manufactured by the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR); in broad strokes, it reflects a particular approach to “assigning weight to the respondent state’s reasoning” under
certain judicially imposed conditions.1 Though developed within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),2 the doctrine has gained
purchase in other international judicial settings.3 Some scholars have suggested that the margin ought to become a general feature of all international adjudication.4 Still, its halting import into the global investment regime is only a relatively recent phenomenon.5 Without questioning the
1. ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
3, 17 (2012). While the margin of appreciation is, for all intents and purposes, a creation of the
ECtHR, there is some dispute as to whether its ultimate origins lie in national or even international
judicial doctrines of deference. Some scholars suggest that the doctrine stems from doctrines of
deference applied in European national courts. See, e.g., id. at 3 (calling the doctrine a “judicial creation” of the ECtHR, whose “origins have been traced to analogous concepts of judicial deference in
the administrative law of a number of European countries,” including in particular France and Germany). More recently, Eirik Bjørge has made a strong case that the doctrine is better understood as
grounded in historical international doctrines of deference to national authorities, specifically the more
state-centric international legal doctrine of the early twentieth century. See Eirik Bjørge, The Margin
of Appreciation: Where Does it Come From and Where Is It Headed? (Feb. 10, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting further that the doctrine’s precursors have long been abandoned in general international law). But for present purposes the doctrine’s pedigree is not at issue.
Wherever the doctrine’s deepest roots lie, the key point is that the margin of appreciation has been
shaped and developed by the ECtHR for nearly four decades, and has become inextricably associated
with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence.
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
3. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa
Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶¶ 62–63 (Jan. 19, 1984).
4. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 907 (2005); see also Jean-Pierre Cot, The Margin of Appreciation, in 6 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1012, 1013 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). But see
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (Feb. 6, 2007)
(“[T]he European Convention on Human Rights permits a margin of appreciation not found in
customary international law . . . .”).
5. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
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propriety of the margin in other supranational judicial contexts, I suggest
that this form of deference is problematic in the context of ad hoc investor-state arbitration. Through comparative analysis of the ECHR and the
international investment regime, I hope to show that certain key grounds
for affording the margin in its original context do not obtain within investor-state arbitration — calling into question the propriety of the doctrine
in its new setting.
In the arbitral context, the margin of appreciation acts as little more
than a pseudo-standard. While appearing to connote a coherent doctrine
of deference, the invocation of the margin tends to obscure the reasoning
behind tribunals’ determination of the appropriate degree of deference in
particular disputes, and obstruct dialogue among tribunals across cases.
Were it to find increased favor, a doctrine of this kind would only hinder
the development of a coherent approach to the standard of review in international investment law.
This relatively granular question about the propriety of the margin of
appreciation falls into a broader discussion about standards of review in
international investment arbitration. It is worth pausing at the outset to
reflect on why the larger issue comes up at all. In broad strokes, the question typically arises where tribunals are called upon to review state action
for compliance with vague and open-ended standards of treatment — like
the requirements to provide foreign investors with “fair and equitable
treatment” (FET) or to refrain from engaging in an indirect expropriation
of their property.6 Taking FET as an example, it is uncontroversial that
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008). Among scholars the idea has been championed by William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden,
Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. 283 (2010); see also Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008).
Several scholars have further advocated for applying the doctrine in the investment context as expert
witnesses in investor-state arbitrations. See El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/15, Witness Statement of Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White (Mar. 4,
2007) (arguing for a margin of appreciation in circumstances of public order or national security).
On the other hand, other tribunals have strongly resisted the import of the margin of appreciation
into the investor-state dispute settlement. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (finding
no support for the margin of appreciation doctrine under the Germany—Argentina BIT at issue, or
under customary international law); see also Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. v. Russian Federation,
Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award (July 20, 2012); Chemtura Corp.
v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 123 (Aug. 2, 2010).
6. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 141, 148–49 (2d ed. 2013); Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 579 (2012) (highlighting other
kinds of situations in which deferential review may be appropriate in investor-state arbitration, as
when faced by the superior scientific expertise of national authorities, or agency fact-finding grounding their regulatory measures); see also Rahim Moloo & Justin M. Jacinto, Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards: Public Interest Regulation in International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2011–2012 539 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2013).
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state action cannot be considered unfair and inequitable solely because it
negatively affects a foreign investor’s bottom line. States retain significant
authority to regulate in the public interest, even if such authority is curtailed by their treaty obligations, and it will often happen that legitimate
regulatory measures will reduce the value of an investment without entailing any violation of the foreign investor’s rights.7 But the question then
arises: how should state action be reviewed where a violation of FET is
alleged? In the absence of any specific guidance from the underlying investment treaties, tribunals have appealed to a wide variety of standards of
review in different contexts, ranging from the very deferential (e.g., good
faith review)8 to the more probing (e.g., proportionality).9 The question of
the appropriate standard of review similarly arises where the tribunal is
called upon to review national authorities’ interpretation of their own domestic law, or to review the state’s factual determinations — ranging from
the scientific fact-finding underlying an environmental measure10 to the
determination of the existence (and requirements) of a national emergency.11
The margin of appreciation arises in this context as one very particular
approach to determining the standard of review in disputes against states.
As indicated above, the margin is most famously a doctrine of deference
employed by the ECtHR for resolving a state’s compliance with its obligations under the ECHR. The basic idea is that the state is entitled to a cer7. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 141. Similarly, in the context of indirect expropriation, see Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID
REV. 1, 6 (2005) (arguing that “cases of regulatory expropriation involve conflicting policies and
interests which are not easily, if at all, reconcilable,” and that tribunals and international lawyers
should “explore in a more systematic way: (i) the policy rationales for providing compensation for
expropriation; and (ii) the contextual factors that weigh in favor of and against compensation.”); L.
Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It
When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV. 293, 297 (2004); see also, e.g., Saluka Investments BV
(The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 261–62 (Mar. 17, 2006) (“[T]he
principle that a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to
a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are ‘commonly accepted as within the police power of States’ forms part of customary international law today.” Interpreting the
relevant BIT’s provisions on expropriation in light of customary international law, the Tribunal held
that even under the Treaty the results of regulatory actions falling within the state’s police powers
non-compensable).
8. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94.
9. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 312–13 (July
14, 2006); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).
10. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 41 (Aug. 3, 2005) (assessing, inter alia, the claimant’s submission that U.S. regulatory
measures “constitute a ‘sham environmental protection in order to cater to local political interests or
in order to protect a domestic industry.’”); see also Julianne J. Marley, Note, The Environmental Endangerment Finding in International Investment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1003 (2014).
11. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶ 339 (May 12, 2005).
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tain “space for maneuver,” within which its conduct is exempt from fullfledged review.12 In other words, so long as the state’s action does not violate a certain minimum threshold of protection, the Court will respect the
state’s determination that its action complies with the Convention — even
if the Court might have come to a different conclusion itself, faced with
the issue de novo.13 Crucially, however, the relevant minimum threshold
varies from right to right in the ECtHR’s case law, and is subject to change
over time under certain conditions — conditions defined by the Court.14
Parallels between the global investment regime and the ECHR make judicial borrowing tempting: both regimes, after all, empower individuals to
bring suit against states directly, before a supranational judicial forum, over
alleged violations of their treaty rights.15 Given this core structural similarity, it may seem natural to import processual doctrines worked out through
the ECtHR’s robust case law to flesh out the relatively young system of
investor-state arbitration.16 But despite the similarities between the regimes, certain key differences account for both the margin’s success in the
ECHR and its counter-productivity in international investment law.
Above all, the coherence of the margin in its original setting must be
understood in light of the fact that the ECHR entails a standing court,
charged with the adjudication of claims against a consistent set of parties
to a single overarching treaty. The ECtHR is effectively the steward of the
human rights system in Europe. By contrast, the investor-state system is
fragmented in all the ways the ECHR is not. Arbitral tribunals are constituted on a one-off basis — for the resolution of particular disputes arising
out of myriad bilateral and multilateral treaties, covering an infinitely complex constellation of states parties. The legal regime depends, for its consistency and development, upon a rich dialogue among investor-state tribunals, litigants, and scholars. The ideas get worked out through the inter12. Schill, supra note 6, at 582; see also Eirik Bjørge, A Theory of National Application of The European Convention on Human Rights 164 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(calling the doctrine “a form of legal discretion which recognizes that the respondent state can be
presumed to be best qualified to appreciate the necessities of a particular situation affecting its jurisdiction”).
13. LEGG, supra note 1, at 3; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 (8th ed. 2012); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (2007); Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation,
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843–44 (1999).
14. See Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 289, 332 (2013) (examining how the ECtHR augments the
breadth of the margin over time, in view of the subsequent practice of the parties evidencing what it
takes to be a new or emerging European Consensus about the scope of a particular Convention
right, or in view of certain kinds of changes in international factual or legal circumstances).
15. It should be stressed that this feature, the grant to individuals and private corporations of the
right to bring direct suit against sovereign states, is extremely rare in general international law. See
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (6th ed. 2008).
16. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 333.
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play of theory and practice over time. As I hope to show, the basic problem with forcing the margin of appreciation into this setting is that it undermines this critical process of dialogue and risks throwing this relatively
fragile legal ecosystem into disarray.
The problem can be illustrated by appeal to the five investor-state
awards to date in which the tribunal invoked the margin of appreciation: in
particular the Award in Continental Casualty v. Argentina (2008); the Award in
Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic (2010); and most recently the Decision on
Liability in Electrabel v. Hungary (2012); as well as the Partial Award in
Saluka v. Czech Republic (2006) and the Decision on Jurisdiction in Micula v.
Romania (2008).17 At a glance, each case seems to have done the same
thing, albeit in different contexts. In each instance, the tribunal found that
the respondent state was entitled to a margin of appreciation, requiring the
arbitrators to treat certain decisions by the national authorities with a degree of deference.18 However, upon closer scrutiny (and as examined in
greater depth below), it appears that despite the consistent invocation of
the margin as a rubric, each of the tribunals ultimately subjected the respondent states’ actions to very different standards of review.19 In order of
greatest to least scrutiny: Continental Casualty engaged in a relatively searching least restrictive means analysis;20 Frontier Petroleum adopted a more lenient review for reasonableness and good faith;21 and Electrabel subjected the
state’s action to review for mere rational basis and good faith.22 Saluka and
Micula, the most deferential and also the most similar, looked for only
“clear and compelling evidence” of error or other improper regulatory

17. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008);
Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010);
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v.
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006) (invoking the respondent’s “margin of discretion”); and Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008) (invoking the margin of appreciation in reviewing the validity of a
non-disputing party’s conferral of nationality on the claimant).
18. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35; Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL, ¶ 527;
Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94; Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181; Saluka,
UNCITRAL, ¶ 272.
19. See discussion infra Part I.B.
20. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9.
21. Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL.
22. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. As discussed further below, Electrabel is unique
among the five investor-state cases in (at least seemingly) suggesting that the margin might apply
differently in different instances. The Tribunal there applied the margin at two separate points in its
analysis, qualifying it as a “modest” margin of appreciation in one instance, id. ¶ 6.92, and a merely
“reasonable” margin in the other, id. ¶ 8.35. The Tribunal explained that a reasonable margin of
appreciation would entail review for rational basis and good faith, but spent no words on what standard of review a modest margin might entail — or to what extent it might differ from the former. See
id. ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35; infra Part I.B.
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action and convincing evidence of fraud or material error (respectively).23 I
do not want to suggest that any of these tribunals misapplied the doctrine.
The problem is rather that the concept of the margin does no work in any
of these awards. It creates only an illusion of consistency, at the heavy cost
of masking serious differences in approach. In other words, the doctrine
acts as an empty proxy for any real analysis of how to approach the truly
sensitive issue: how to determine the appropriate level of deference due to
a sovereign, if any, in a particular case.
To be clear at the outset, I do not want to argue against judicial borrowing in all contexts. Especially within investment law, borrowing and analogy represent critical tools for refining and developing the law.24 Nor do I
want to collaterally attack the margin of appreciation as such — indeed the
doctrine has played a very important role in the ECtHR, and to a lesser
extent within the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.25 Most importantly, I do not want to argue against any and all judicial deference in
the adjudication of investor-state disputes. What I do very much doubt is
the propriety of this particular doctrine in the particular context of the ad
hoc settlement of disputes through investor-state arbitration. Here, this capacious doctrine merely papers over the problem of fragmented approaches to the standard of review, with the effect of producing more uncertainty — not less.
The following Part will first situate the debate on the propriety of the
margin of appreciation within the broader issue of deference and standards of review in investor-state arbitration. Part II will then turn to the
case law to demonstrate the principal problem missed by the debate thus
far — that the margin produces only an illusion of coherence, while obscuring important divergences in these tribunals’ approaches to working
out the appropriate standard of review in particular cases. Part III will examine the margin of appreciation in its original context, in order to illuminate the source of its poor fit within the international investment regime.
Within the ECtHR, I suggest, the margin of appreciation is contentless by
design — allowing the Court to adopt a flexible and evolutionary approach
to the adjudication of human rights disputes over time in the face of widespread cultural diversity. As I hope to show, the doctrine is only given
meaning through this standing court’s rich jurisprudence. Returning to the
global investment regime in Part IV, I argue that the purposefully vague
and variable facets of the doctrine make it uniquely unsuitable in the con23. Saluka, UNCITRAL, ¶ 272, 273; Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 95.
24. See discussion infra Part III; Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 50 (2013).
25. See generally LEGG, supra note 1, at 3. But see Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 843 (suggesting that
the doctrine has had perhaps an overly important role, overly prioritizing moral relativism at the
expense of universal principles in the adjudication of human rights disputes).
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text of ad hoc dispute resolution arising out of a fragmented multitude of
diverse investment treaties. The margin’s inherent open texture helps explain why it has thus far produced dramatically inconsistent results in every
such case in which it has been applied. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I suggest that the broader problem of legal certainty arising out of fragmented
approaches to the standard of review in international investment arbitration will not likely be resolved by appeal to a unified a priori standard of
review, as a one-size-fits-all solution.26 The right answers will take time to
work out and will only coalesce gradually, through well-reasoned arbitral
practice, knitted together over time through rich judicial dialogue.

I. THE MARGIN IN INVESTMENT LAW
Over the last few years, the margin of appreciation has found growing
favor within investor-state arbitration. Respondent states, in particular, are
increasingly invoking the margin in defending claims impugning the accordance of their conduct with applicable bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), often by direct reference to the case law of the ECtHR.27 Similar
claims have arisen under more nuanced multilateral investment treaties,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)28 and the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).29 The margin appeals to respondent states
because it assumes a priori that the state is entitled to a degree of deference — a “space of maneuver” — in complying with its treaty obligations.30 Because respondents can rarely find explicit authority for deferential review in their treaties, they have increasingly turned to the ECtHR’s

26. This argument assumes current institutional arrangements as a given. The picture may of
course look very different under a more centralized judicial regime for the resolution of international
investment disputes — as, for example, an appellate mechanism within the ICSID system, or an
entirely new standing international investment court. See, e.g., UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 2: Reform
of
Investor-State
Dispute
Settlement:
In
Search
of
a
Roadmap,
at
8–9,
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (June 2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web
diaepcb2013d4_en.pdf (exploring both institutional mechanisms as possible avenues of reform). The
problem, for present purposes, is to grapple with the contemporary absence of any formal institutional centrality in the global investment regime; the possibility of future centralization lies beyond
this Article’s scope.
27. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 434–36 (July 24, 2008) (recounting the respondent’s argument that, as a sovereign state, Tanzania was acting well within its margin of appreciation under international law). The
respondent relied exclusively on ECtHR cases in supporting this position. Id. ¶ 434 (citing Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 18 Jan. 1978, §§ 214, 229, Ser. A no. 25; Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 Nov. 1984,
§ 40, Ser. A no. 87; Lithgow & Others v. United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, Ser. A no. 102; and Smith &
Grady v. United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96, 33986/96, § 77, ECHR 1999-VI).
28. See Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 123 (Aug. 2, 2010).
29. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012).
30. See Schill, supra note 6, at 584.
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well-established jurisprudence for support in the hopes of establishing that
they are at least entitled to some degree of deference in principle.
Invocations of the margin have thus far yielded only a mixed track record for respondents. Some tribunals have expressly rejected the doctrine. For example, the Tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina held that as regards
the right to property, “the European Convention on Human Rights permits a margin of appreciation not found in customary international law or
the [Germany-Argentina BIT].”31 And other tribunals have simply ignored
the respondent’s invocation of the doctrine.32 But a handful of arbitral
tribunals have expressly employed the margin in reviewing states’ conduct
under investment treaties — both at the respondent’s urging, as in Continental Casualty v. Argentina, and apparently sua sponte as in Frontier Petroleum v.
Czech Republic and Electrabel v. Hungary.33 Suffice it to say that from a highaltitude review of the cases, the long-term acceptance of the doctrine in
the context of investor-state arbitration remains to be seen.
Still, the mere notion that the margin of appreciation has a role to play
within investor-state arbitration has sparked a polarized scholarly debate.
As I hope to show, recourse to the doctrine thus far has also already produced significant jurisprudential problems. By way of background, this
Part will first situate the debate about the margin in the broader discussion
of the appropriate role and contours of judicial deference in investor-state
arbitration. I will then turn to the cases where the doctrine has found favor, in hopes of illustrating its poor fit within the investment regime.

A. Deference and the Standard of Review
The problem of standards of review in investment law starts with silence. As noted above, investment treaties tend to say nothing about the
standards of review applicable to disputes between sovereign states and
foreign investors over the meaning or application of their provisions.
However the fact of their silence on this issue should not be surprising,
31. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (Feb. 6,
2007); see also Chemtura, UNCITRAL, ¶ 123 (holding that “the assessment of the facts is an integral
part of its review under Article 1105 of NAFTA. In assessing whether the treatment afforded to the
Claimant’s investment was in accordance with the international minimum standard, the Tribunal must
take into account all the circumstances, including the fact that certain agencies manage highly specialized domains involving scientific and public policy determinations. This is not an abstract assessment
circumscribed by a legal doctrine about the margin of appreciation of specialized regulatory agencies.
It is an assessment that must be conducted in concreto. The Tribunal will proceed to such assessment in
concreto when reviewing the specific measures challenged by the Claimant.”).
32. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, ¶¶ 434–36 (recounting Tanzania’s invocation of the margin of appreciation at length in summarizing the respondent’s position, but completely ignoring the argument in its own analysis of the case).
33. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181 & n.270
(Sept. 5, 2008); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 527
(Nov. 12, 2010); Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, ¶ 6.92.
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and would not be necessarily problematic by itself. It is indeed unusual to
find express guidance on appropriate standards of review in the constituent instruments of international courts and tribunals, or even in national
constitutions.34 The silence of investment treaties becomes problematic
only in view of the fragmented nature of the investment regime.
As a preliminary matter, it should be understood that the very idea that
any deference should be afforded to host states is controversial, though
increasingly less so. Investment arbitration was, for a long time, considered
merely a sub-species of international commercial arbitration or, in other
words, a purely private dispute between the investor and the State-quaprivate party. As Stephan Schill explains, any notion of deference in that
setting was considered “anathema” as a violation of a fundamental principle of international arbitration: the parties’ equality of arms.35 However, as
Burke-White and von Staden have amply shown, it is increasingly clear that
the investment arbitration regime has moved from its purely private origins
into a form of thoroughgoing public law litigation, in which foreign investors regularly challenge host states’ fundamental regulatory policy.36
Tribunals have increasingly come to appreciate this evolution, and have
turned to the idea of deferential standards of review as a tool for balanc34. In the United States, the idea of differentiating among various standards of review appropriate to different cases (i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review) is completely judge-made. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Similarly, the
famous German doctrine of proportionality review is found nowhere in the Basic Law; it too is
judge-made. See, e.g., Apotheken-Urteil [Pharmacy Case], Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVERFGE] 377, 1958 (Ger.); see also Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2012). Similarly, in the ECtHR, the margin of
appreciation is a wholly judge-made doctrine, and has remained un-codified for sixty years, although
it will likely be incorporated into the preamble to the ECHR soon. See Protocol No. 15 Amending the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature June
24,
2013,
art.
1,
C.E.T.S.
No.
213,
https://wcd.
coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2012)166&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackCo
lorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 (appending the
following recital to the end of the preamble: “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin
of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
established by this Convention[.]”). Article 1 of Protocol 15 will only come into force upon ratification by all the parties; although universal ratification appears likely, at the time of writing, Protocol 15
has been signed by only twenty-one out of forty-seven, and ratified by just one (Ireland). Up-to-date
figures on signatures and ratifications are available at Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR. TREATY OFFICE (June 27, 2013),
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=213&CM=8&
DF=27/06/2013&CL=ENG.
35. Schill, supra note 6, at 587.
36. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 287; see also William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of NonPrecluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 316 (2008); Roberts,
supra note 24, at 46–49; Schill, supra note 6, at 579.
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ing the regulatory authority of the state against foreign investors’ rights
and legitimate expectations under investment treaties.37 Different arbitral
panels have identified and relied on a dizzying set of standards of review
in different cases, drawn from international and national orders, and both
civil and common law jurisdictions. These standards generally involve
some particular linguistic formulation connoting a test. They range from
the simple to the nuanced, and from the extremely deferential to the relatively strict.
Some standards entail only minimal review, limited, for example, to the
assessment of good faith, rational basis, or reasonableness (in order of
greatest to least deference). Other standards involve more sophisticated
tests, and will tend to involve a more searching (i.e., less deferential) analysis of impugned governmental action. For example, in applying the least
restrictive means (LRM) analysis favored in WTO jurisprudence, a court
will uphold a measure so long as it was (1) necessary to a legitimate state
aim, and (2) the least restrictive means reasonably available toward achieving that end.38 Proportionality review is even more strict (if more subjective), adding to the LRM analysis a third prong whereby even if a measure
satisfies LRM the court will balance the value of achieving that legitimate
aim against its interference with the claimant’s right.39 Finally, U.S.-style
“strict scrutiny” represents a maximally searching (or minimally deferential) standard of review, requiring that to survive scrutiny a measure must
be both “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and also
the least restrictive means toward achieving its aim.40
Arbitral tribunals have turned to each of these widely varied approaches
in grappling with the silence of their underlying treaties. The effect is a
state of general uncertainty as to what the standard of review might be
from one case to the next — whether the state will be entitled to significant deference in comporting with its treaty obligations, or whether it will
be subject to more exacting review. The tribunal’s choice of standard thus
has serious consequences, and can easily prove decisive in a particular arbi37. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 141.
38. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 308, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). Within investment law, see
Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 196; Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO
Law: In Comparative Perspective, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 371, 378 (2007).
39. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Government of Israel [2004] (Isr.); AHARON
BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012). In the
context of investor-state arbitration, see Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). Among scholars, Alec Stone
Sweet has been a forceful advocate for reliance on proportionality review in the context of investorstate arbitration. See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 76 (2010).
40. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
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tration. As the significance of these choices becomes increasingly apparent, the problem of uncertainty is moving rapidly to the forefront.41 Faced
with this state of confusion, a growing number of scholars have sought
out a more unified approach to the standard of review, applicable across a
wide variety of cases.42
The debate about the margin of appreciation in international investment law arises out of this broader problem of identifying an appropriate
standard of review in the context of ad hoc arbitrations based on thousands of disparate legal instruments.43 On the one side, advocates have
been spurred by a perceived need to expand judicial deference in investorstate arbitration where tribunals are faced with disputes that implicate public law, including, for example, disputes over the effects of fundamental
state regulatory policy in areas like the environment, health, or public morals, as well as state action in the context of emergencies.44 Supporters of
the margin in the investor-state context question whether non-national
arbitrators ought to pass judgment on the state’s domestic regulatory policy. At least in the context of some such “public law” disputes, they argue
that a degree of deference is necessary, and that the margin of appreciation represents an appropriate mechanism for achieving the correct balance.45 Most importantly, they emphasize that the margin approach is suitable across all kinds of cases.46 Burke-White and von Staden stress that the
doctrine envisions different degrees of deference in different contexts.47
According to them, where an investment dispute has a public character,
the margin of appreciation allows the arbitrator the flexibility to determine
whether a wide or limited degree of deference would be appropriate; and
where an arbitration between a state and a foreign investor entails a purely
private dispute, no margin should be afforded to the respondent state at all
(i.e., the latter is entitled to no deference).48 On this view, the margin fits
better than other standards within investment law because of its characteristic elasticity.
On the other side, several critics reject the margin as inappropriate in
the investor-state context — but they have tended to focus on what they
41. In Anthea Roberts’s phrase, the issue of the standard of review is likely to prove the next battleground in the theory and practice of international investment arbitration. Anthea Roberts, The
Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 16 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB.
CONGRESS SERIES 170, 172 (2011).
42. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 286, 333.
43. These instruments include thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as contracts
and national investment laws.
44. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 292; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 827.
45. See Andreas von Staden, Deference or No Deference, That is the Question: Legitimacy and Standards of
Review in Investor-State Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, July 19, 2012, at 3, 3–4.
46. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 286, 323, 333.
47. Id. at 305–06.
48. Id. at 288.
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take to be problems with the notion of deference as such.49 They reject the
margin as affording too much deference to respondent states, emphasizing
that the purpose of the investor-state arbitral regime is to protect foreign
investors from undue interference by host states. These critics portray the
margin as a means of giving respondent states a free pass to accomplish
indirectly what they cannot do directly.50 In other words, it enables states
to cheat — to take advantage of deference by dressing up mere interference in the clothes of public law (e.g., by engaging in indirect expropriation through dubious environmental measures).51 Indeed they tend to go
further and reject all deference in the investor-state context, advocating
instead U.S.-style “strict scrutiny.”52 The criticisms are generally quantitative; the arguments tend to reduce into either the old contention that any
deference is inappropriate in the context of investor-state arbitration, or
that, at any rate, this particular doctrine affords the state too much leeway.
In my view, the debate has missed the conceptual core of the problem
with importing a doctrine like the margin of appreciation into the ad hoc
adjudicatory setting. The problem is not that the doctrine affords deference to respondent states as such, or that it necessarily entails too much
deference. Advocates for the margin raise compelling arguments about the
need for deferential standards of review in investment law, at least in some
contexts. The deeper problem with the margin is that it entails no particular standard of review. As regards the scope and degree of deference due
to national decision-makers, the margin of appreciation is essentially
contentless. And indeed, as constructed by the ECtHR, the doctrine is
contentless by design.
By contrast to the varied standards of review considered above, the
margin of appreciation does not entail any concrete linguistic standard or
specific test. Unlike review for good faith, reasonableness, LRM, and proportionality, the margin does not inherently imply any particular level of
deference to the decisions of national authorities. While it recognizes in
principle that some deference is due to respondent states, the doctrine is
contentless as to the scope and degree of that deference in the abstract.53
49. See Kassi D. Tallent, The Tractor in the Jungle: Why Investment Arbitration Tribunals Should Reject a
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION & INTERNATIONAL LAW
111 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010); Sarah Vasani, Bowing to the Queen: Rejecting the Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in International Investment Arbitration, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 162–63 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010).
50. See Tallent, supra note 49, at 113; Vasani, supra note 49, at 149.
51. See, for an oft-cited example, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) (wherein Mexican authorities declared the region around the
claimant’s waste disposal facility a protected area for a rare form of cactus on apparently dubious
grounds, thereby precluding Metalclad from operating its facilities).
52. See Tallent, supra note 49, at 113, 134; see also Vasani, supra note 49, at 149, 162–65 (acknowledging that at least emergency situations “warrant increased scrutiny”).
53. At most the Court has pointed to certain factors that it considers relevant to the scope of the
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B. Recourse to the Margin of Appreciation
The best way to draw out the indeterminacy inherent in the margin as
applied in the context of ad hoc arbitration is by comparing the cases —
specifically the five awards where the tribunal relied on the doctrine to
date: Continental Casualty v. Argentina, Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic,
Electrabel v. Hungary, Saluka v. Czech Republic, and Micula v. Romania.54
Continental Casualty was one of several arbitrations arising out of the Argentine financial crisis of 2001.55 Continental, an American company,
claimed that Argentina’s emergency fiscal measures had interfered with its
investment in Argentina (an insurance company named CNA
Aseguradora), thereby substantially diminishing its value in violation of
several provisions of the U.S.—Argentina BIT (to the tune of roughly $70
million). Argentina argued that its measures were not wrongful because
they constituted lawful derogations from the BIT under the “nonprecluded measures” clause at Article XI, exempting, inter alia, measures
“necessary for the maintenance of public order,” or the protection of the
state’s own “essential security interests” from constituting violations of the
treaty. For present purposes, the relevant question of the appropriate
standard of review arose out of the question of who gets to decide
whether or not Article XI applied in the present circumstance — the Tribunal or the respondent state itself (meaning that the clause would be
“self-judging” on the question of applicability)? And if the Tribunal, then
how much, if any, deference should be afforded to the respondent state?
The Tribunal held that the clause was not self-judging, and that it thus
had to determine whether the financial crisis triggered Article XI. In determining the applicability of this derogation clause, however, the Tribunal
held that the respondent state should be entitled to a margin of appreciation, citing to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.56 In the words of the Trimargin in particular cases. In Buckley v. United Kingdom, 25 Sept. 1996, § 74, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions, 1996-IV, the Court held that “[t]he scope of this margin of appreciation is not identical in
each case but will vary according to the context . . . . Relevant factors include the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the activities concerned.”
See also Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 98, ECHR 2010 (observing that “[t]he scope of
the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background.”). However, it provides no doctrinal explanation for how it weighs these factors in particular
cases.
54. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008);
Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010);
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008).
55. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 53.
56. Id. ¶ 181 (citing Jahn & Others v. Germany, nos. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, ECHR
2005-VI) (further citing Shany, supra note 4). The Tribunal notes, in the footnote, that “A certain
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bunal, “this objective assessment must contain a significant margin of appreciation for the State applying the particular measure: a time of grave
crisis is not the time for nice judgments, particularly when examined by
others with the disadvantage of hindsight.”57
Rather than impose a strict review, the Tribunal determined that, given
the state’s margin of appreciation, it would only be appropriate to engage
in a relatively deferential LRM analysis, asking only (1) whether the impugned measures were necessary to a legitimate end, and (2) whether these
means were the least restrictive measures reasonably available to achieving
that purpose.58 With respect to all but one relatively minor claim, the Tribunal found that Argentina’s measures satisfied the LRM test and thus
constituted non-precluded measures under Article XI — thereby immunizing the respondent state from liability under the BIT.59
Frontier Petroleum involved a much less dramatic kind of dispute. It belongs to a line of cases interrogating the liability of a respondent state for
the actions of its judiciary in refusing to enforce a commercial arbitral
award between two private parties.60 Frontier, a Canadian company,
claimed that it had made a significant investment in the Czech Republic
through a joint venture to manufacture aircrafts with a private Czech company (Moravan).61 After disputes arose between the two companies, the
claimant commenced and won a private commercial arbitration in Stockholm, and sought to enforce the award in the Czech Republic under the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).62 The Czech courts refused
deference to such a discretion [of the respondent state] when the application of general standards in
a specific factual situation is at issue, such as reasonable, necessary, fair and equitable, may well be by
now a general feature of international law also in respect of the protection of foreign investors under BITs.” Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181 n.270.
57. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181.
58. Id. ¶¶ 193–95; see also Sweet, supra note 39, at 73–74.
59. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 320 (the one exception entailed a comparatively
small sum of U.S. $2.8 million, relative to the U.S. $70 million originally claimed).
60. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7,
Award (June 30, 2009); ATA Constr., Indus. & Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (May 18, 2000); White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India,
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011). But see GEA Grp. Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/16, Award (Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that a commercial arbitral award does not
constitute an investment, and thus that State authority’s refusal to enforce any such award is not, on
its own, actionable before an ICSID tribunal). See generally D. Brian King & Rahim Moloo, Enforcement
After the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public International Law Fora, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONTEXT 393, 412–26 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013).
61. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 26 (Nov. 12,
2010).
62. The New York Convention provides only very limited grounds for a State to refuse to enforce an arbitral award, one of which is a relatively narrow category of public policy. United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
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enforcement as a matter of public policy (one of the few permissible
grounds for refusing enforcement under the New York Convention (Article V(2)(b))), citing Moravan’s intervening bankruptcy, the need to maintain the equality of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, and the equitable
and orderly distribution of assets.63 As a measure of last resort, Frontier
brought a direct claim against the Czech Republic as an investor under the
Canada—Czech BIT, alleging that the Czech authorities’ refusal to enforce
its commercial award constituted, inter alia, a breach of the BIT obligation
to afford foreign investors fair and equitable treatment.
The crucial issue implicating the standard of review was how to determine whether the respondent state had actually breached its obligation
under the New York Convention, given that it claimed to have refused enforcement pursuant to the valid public policy exception under Article
V(2)(b). In the Tribunal’s view, this task amounted to determining whether
the Czech courts’ interpretation of the public policy exception in Article
V(2)(b) was “made in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner,” or otherwise
amounted to a breach of FET.64 According to the Tribunal in Frontier Petroleum, it would not be necessary to determine for itself whether the findings
of the Czech courts met the standard of public policy under Article
V(2)(b), nor would it be appropriate for it to determine the precise contents of that standard.65 Instead, it held that “States enjoy a certain margin
of appreciation in determining what their own conception of international
public policy is.”66 The Tribunal thus limited itself to a highly deferential
form of review, asking only whether the Czech courts’ interpretation of
public policy under the New York Convention was “reasonably tenable and
made in good faith.”67 The Tribunal found no reason to doubt the Czech
courts’ good faith, and was satisfied with the reasonableness of the courts’
interpretation of public policy by evidence that this view was corroborated
in French and German national jurisprudence, as well as in academic
commentary.68 The Tribunal thus found no violation of the BIT.
The third case, Electrabel v. Hungary, concerned a dispute arising out of
Hungary’s accession to the European Union (EU), and its subsequent efforts to harmonize its laws with binding EU regulations.69 In 1995, Hunrefused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that: . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.”).
63. Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL, ¶ 29.
64. Id. ¶ 525.
65. Id. ¶ 527.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. ¶¶ 528–30.
69. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012).
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gary caused a then-state-owned power plant operator (Dunamenti) to enter
into a power-purchase agreement (PPA) with a separate state-owned energy supply company, guaranteeing the latter’s purchase of a large, fixed
quantity of electricity from the former. The goal was to make Dunamenti
attractive to private, and especially foreign, investment; the PPA would act,
in effect, as a lucrative government subsidy. Between 1995 and 2001, the
claimant, a Belgian corporation, invested heavily into Dunamenti, presumably to take advantage of the attractive PPA. The most significant dispute
arose in connection with Hungary’s accession to the EU, in 2004, due to a
perceived inconsistency between Dunamenti’s preferential PPA and EU
regulations prohibiting such subsidies. Hungary ultimately terminated the
PPA in 2008 in compliance with a binding order to do so by the European
Commission in the form of a “Final Decision.”70 Notably, Hungary declined to challenge the Commission’s decision before the EU courts.71
Electrabel thus brought an ICSID claim against Hungary under the Energy Charter Treaty, contending that the state’s termination of the PPA constituted an indirect expropriation and a violation of FET. Though less significant to the overall arbitration, Electrabel further complained of Hungary’s reintroduction of regulated electricity pricing in 2006, which the
claimant contended violated its legitimate expectations and forced
Dunamenti to lower its prices by 40 percent.72
The Electrabel Tribunal invoked the margin of appreciation at two different points in its analysis. It resolved the bulk of the dispute by determining that Hungary was under an obligation to comply with EU regulations and could not bear international responsibility for complying with
any binding orders by the Union under the terms of the ECT.73 However,
the issue of deference arose in relation to two remaining issues: whether
Hungary should have challenged the European Commission’s Final Decision before the EU courts; and, separately, whether Hungary’s reintroduction of regulated pricing in 2006 violated Electrabel’s legitimate expectations (and thus FET). First, in resolving whether Hungary should have
challenged the European Commission’s Final Decision, the Tribunal held
that “Hungary was entitled to a modest margin of appreciation in arriving at
its own discretionary decision in regard to such proceedings, without
thereby committing a breach of the ECT’s FET standard.”74 The Tribunal
went no further in explaining what level of review any such “modest”
margin would entail, simply finding Hungary not liable for failing to challenge the Commission’s decision.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. ¶ 2.24.
Id. ¶ 6.92.
Id. ¶ 2.12.
Id. ¶ 4.40 (finding that ECT itself envisions compliance with EU regulations).
Id. ¶ 6.92 (emphasis added).
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The Tribunal was somewhat more specific in invoking the margin a second time, later in the case. In assessing Hungary’s regulation of electricity
prices, the Tribunal held that, at least as regards that particular sector of
the economy, “[r]egulatory pricing (by operation of law) was and remains
an important measure available to State regulators.”75 As a result, the Tribunal determined that the state enjoyed a “reasonable margin of appreciation in taking such measures before being held to account under the ECT’s
standards of protection.”76 The Tribunal added that its “task is not here to
sit retrospectively in judgment upon Hungary’s discretionary exercise of a
sovereign power, not made irrationally and not exercised in bad faith towards Dunamenti at the relevant time.”77 Notably, the Tribunal’s language
gives pause as to whether it applied the doctrine in the same way in each
instance — whether, in other words, a “reasonable” margin of appreciation is the same as a “modest” one. At least in the former case, it seems as
though the Tribunal considered the doctrine to call for a review for rational basis and good faith; as for the “modest” version of the doctrine, the
reader is simply left wondering.
Two further cases merit brief mention. The first is Saluka v. Czech Republic, wherein the Tribunal afforded the respondent state a “margin of discretion” in assessing the compliance of its regulatory action with the Czech—
Netherlands BIT provision on expropriation.78 In relevant part, the claimant complained that the respondent had expropriated its investment in a
Czech bank by placing the ailing institution under state administration.
Despite the slightly different linguistic formulation, the Tribunal engaged
in a similar kind of analysis to the above cases. The Tribunal held that, in
view of the bank’s financial state, the Czech State “had the responsibility
to take a decision,” and that it “enjoyed a margin of discretion in the exercise of that responsibility.”79 Given that margin, the Tribunal reviewed only for “clear and compelling evidence that the [Czech banking regulator]
erred or acted otherwise improperly in reaching its decision” to put the
bank under forced administration.80 In the absence of any such evidence,
the Tribunal considered itself bound to accept the justification given by
the Czech authorities.81
Finally, in Micula v. Romania, the Tribunal invoked the margin of appreciation in assessing the validity of the claimant’s acquisition of Swedish
nationality. Though born a Romanian national, Micula claimed the right to
75. Id. ¶ 8.35.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006).
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶ 273.
81. Id.
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sue Romania under the Sweden—Romania BIT on the grounds that he
had both renounced his Romanian nationality and acquired Swedish nationality. Romania challenged his claim to foreign nationality, alleging that
the claimant had acquired Swedish nationality through fraud or material
mistake of fact.82 Noting that Sweden was not a party to the dispute, the
Tribunal invoked the margin to ground an extremely deferential standard
of review. It considered that the “State conferring nationality must be given a ‘margin of appreciation’ in deciding upon the factors that it considers
necessary for the granting of nationality,”83 and determined under that
rubric that it could only disregard the Swedish authorities’ decision if there
was “convincing and decisive evidence” that the “acquisition of Swedish
nationality was fraudulent or at least resulted from a material error.”84
Taking stock, none of these cases, on their own, seem glaringly problematic. In each instance the Tribunal determined that the state was due a
margin of appreciation in a particular context, and accordingly scrutinized
its impugned measures under a more or less lenient standard. But viewing
the awards side by side, it appears that each of these tribunals adopted
very different standards of review under the seemingly consistent rubric
of the margin: a somewhat deferential LRM analysis in Continental Casualty;85 a more deferential review for reasonableness and good faith in Frontier
Petroleum;86 still lighter review for a mere rational basis and good faith in
Electrabel;87 and even more deferential approaches in Saluka and Micula,
with the former reviewing for clear and compelling evidence of regulatory
error or other impropriety,88 and the latter reviewing only for clear and
convincing evidence of fraud or material error.89 The problem is not that
any of these tribunals misapplied the margin — but rather that the doctrine
82. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
¶ 94 (Sept. 24, 2008). (Sweden was not a party to the dispute).
83. Id., citing Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶¶ 62–63 (Jan. 19,
1984).
84. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 95.
85. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181 (Sept. 5,
2008).
86. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 527 (Nov. 12,
2010).
87. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 8.35 (Nov. 30, 2012) (finding the State entitled to a “reasonable” margin of appreciation, which seemed to require only that the state’s determination was “not
made irrationally and not exercised in bad faith” — i.e., rational basis review). The Electrabel Tribunal
indicated in a separate instance that the State was entitled to a differently qualified “modest” margin
of appreciation, but left unsaid whether this entailed a weaker standard of review, and if so, what
kind of analysis it might have entailed. Id. ¶ 6.92.
88. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006).
89. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94.
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itself provides no guidance one way or another as to the appropriate
standard of review. While indicating merely that some deference is appropriate, these invocations of the margin obscure the deeper issue of how
much.
Of course these cases did not necessarily all call for the same standard
of review. Cases like Electrabel and Saluka seem to call for the same kind of
standard insofar as each tribunal weighed the respondent’s justification of
its regulatory action as coming under its police power — and it stands out
that the one engaged in rational basis review, while the other reviewed only
for clear and compelling evidence of error or impropriety. But on the other hand, it seems fairly reasonable that the determination of an absent
third state as to nationality would be entitled to substantially more deference than the assessment of a respondent state’s invocation of a public
policy exception to its treaty obligation to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
To be sure, different standards of review may be appropriate in different
circumstances. The point is rather that the doctrine of the margin does no
work in actually determining what the right standard should be. At least in
the context of ad hoc investment arbitration, the problem is that the doctrine appears to be doing work, but in reality amounts to a mere pseudostandard — a substitute for real reasoning. In other words, the invocation
of the margin of appreciation as a rubric creates a false impression of
consistency across cases like Continental Casualty, Frontier Petroleum, Electrabel,
Saluka, and Micula, while obscuring significant differences in the type and
degree of deference afforded therein.
The problem comes down to institutions. As indicated above, the margin of appreciation is by no means a useless doctrine in all judicial contexts, even in light of its apparent hollowness. Indeed, in the practice of
the ECtHR the doctrine appears to be contentless by design; its flexibility is
a feature there, not a flaw. The following Part will thus turn to an examination of the margin in Strasbourg, in hopes that a comparison to the operation of the doctrine in its original setting will be instructive as to its poor
fit in the context of international investment law.

II. STRASBOURGEOIS DEFERENCE
In comparison to the fragmented international investment regime, the
ECHR represents the exemplar of a systematized supranational judicial
order. At its pinnacle sits the ECtHR, a standing court charged with the
adjudication of human rights disputes between individuals and the 47 parties to the Convention. The ECHR permits individuals to bring direct
claims against the states parties — and they do so frequently. Today the
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Court’s backlog is well over 100,000 cases, and ever growing.90 All this
means that the Strasbourg Court enjoys ample opportunities to interpret
(and reinterpret) the rights of the Convention — and it has developed a
formidable case law over its sixty-plus years in operation.91
While the margin of appreciation is, today, a fixture of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the Court developed the doctrine only gradually, over the last
forty years.92 The ECtHR first deployed the concept in the 1976 case
Handyside v. United Kingdom — a case implicating the freedom of expression
at Article 10 of the Convention, which expressly admits limitations by the
state for purposes of regulating public morals.93 The question, then, was
how much weight to give to the state’s own determination that it was acting within the scope of that exception. The case involved the state’s seizure, on grounds of obscenity, of several thousand copies of The Little Red
School Book — a book which encouraged young people to experiment with
sex and drugs and otherwise challenge the authority of adult “paper tigers.”94 The Court famously refused to scrutinize the United Kingdom’s
decision to confiscate the books, declaring the state entitled to a “margin
of appreciation” in determining the appropriate contours of the public
morals exception in Article 10(2).95 The Court pointed out that:
[T]he machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights . . . . The
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the
task of securing the rights and liberties it enshrines . . . . By reason
of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of [the]

90. As a snapshot, in 2009 alone the Court received 57,200 applications, and the Court’s backlog
reached 119,300. Council of Europe Press Division, Fact Sheet: Protocol 14, The Reform of the
European Court of Human Rights (May 25, 2010), available at https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.
IstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1566940&SecMode=1&DocI
d=1583116&Usage=2.
91. See Arato, supra note 14, at 333.
92. Only in the last few years have the parties begun the process of formally codifying the judgemade doctrine, culminated in Protocol 15, opened for signature on April 29, 2013, which provides,
inter alia, for incorporating a reference to the margin of appreciation in the preamble to the Convention. See Protocol No. 15, supra note 34.
93. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 Dec. 1976, Ser. A no. 24. The exception clause at art. 10(2)
states that: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,” including, inter alia, “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals.” ECHR, supra note 2, art. 10(2).
94. Handyside, §§ 20, 32.
95. Id. § 48.
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requirements [of public morals] as well as on the “necessity” of a
“restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them.96
The key justification for affording deference to the state was thus, at
this stage, based on the doctrine of subsidiarity. The idea was that, in those
cases where the state was in a better position to determine the line between a qualified right and its exception in light of the “vital forces” of its
own country, the Court would defer to the state’s interpretation of its obligations under the Convention.
Shortly after Handyside, the Court extended the doctrine to states’ derogations in the context of national emergencies in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom.97 The issue here was to assess the state’s judgment that it was
acting within the meaning of the Convention’s general provisions on derogation, permitting states to derogate from the ECHR “in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”98 And here too
the Court grounded its answer in the principle of subsidiarity, holding that:
[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing
needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a
better position than the international judge to decide both on the
presence of such an emergency and on the nature and the scope of
derogations necessary to avert it.99
Such deference would not be limitless, but the Court would afford the
state a wide berth.100
Over the years the Court has dramatically extended and fleshed out the
doctrine to encompass its review of state compliance with a wide array of
substantive rights of the Convention — not only as a matter of subsidiarity, but increasingly as a means of fostering the rich cultural, political, and
legal diversity across the parties to the Convention. In other words, as
Benvenisti notes, the doctrine is today largely “based on the notion that
each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts
between individual rights and national interests or among different moral
convictions.”101 As the modern doctrine stands, the Court will afford
states a margin of appreciation as regards their compliance with (most) of
96. Id. §§ 48–49 (emphasis added).
97. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 48, Ser. A no. 25.
98. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 15. It is worth bearing in mind the parallel between this situation and
Argentina’s invocation of the non-precluded measure clause in the Argentina—United States BIT in
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008).
99. Ireland v. United Kingdom, § 207.
100. Id. (“Article 15 § 1 leaves [national] authorities a wide margin of appreciation. Nevertheless,
the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect.”).
101. Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 843–44. No supporter of the doctrine, Benvenisti goes on to
state that the “Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral relativism, is at odds
with the concept of the universality of human rights” and that its use should be curtailed within the
ECtHR. Id. at 844.
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the Convention rights,102 reviewing their laws, regulations, and measures
for conformity to a certain minimum threshold, beyond which the Court
will respect the decisions of each state to determine how best to effectuate
the right within its borders.
As noted above, the core idea is that the Court will respect the state’s
determination of its obligations under the Convention — based on subsidiarity or cultural diversity — even if the Court would have itself come
to a different decision if presented with the matter de novo. However, it is
easier to frame the margin as an abstract principle than to pin down its full
doctrinal contours. In practice, the margin represents something of a moving target: unlike typical standards of review, within the ECHR the margin
affords national authorities a variable level of deference, shifting from right
to right, and over time.
In the first place, the Court gives states a wider or narrower space of
deference depending on the Convention provision in question — taking
into consideration the context and importance of the interests at issue.
Speaking in general terms, in Buckley v. United Kingdom the Court offered
the vague explanation that “[r]elevant factors include the nature of the
Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature
of the activities concerned.”103 While such a broad factor-based test tells
us relatively little, a closer look at the cases reveals some clear trends. For
example, in the context of assessing state measures regarding public emergencies,104 national security,105 the protection of public morals,106 and interference with private property,107 the Court tends to afford states a
102. The exception being a handful of “absolute rights,” for example the prohibition of torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment at Article 3 or the prohibition of slavery at Article 4, which
entails no qualification and affords no derogation under Article 15. See ECHR, supra note 2, art. 3
(“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”), art.
15(2) (“No derogation . . . from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.”).
103. Buckley v. United Kingdom, 25 Sept. 1996, § 74, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-IV;
see also Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 98, ECHR 2010 (observing that “[t]he scope of the
margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background.”). However, it provides no doctrinal explanation for how it weighs these factors in particular
cases.
104. Ireland v. United Kingdom, § 48; Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, § 40,
§§ 41–43, Ser. A no. 258-B (both cases affording a wide margin to the State’s decision to derogate
from the Convention “[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”).
105. Klass & Others v. Germany, 6 Sept. 1978, Ser. A no. 28 (1978) (concerning a secret surveillance system aimed at combating terrorism).
106. Handyside v. United Kingdom, §§ 48–49, 7 Dec. 1976, Ser. A no. 24.
107. Perhaps of greatest relevance to international investment law, the Court takes a highly deferential approach to the right to property, affording a “wide” margin in cases alleging either a deprivation of, or interference with, private property by the State in violation of ECHR Article 1, Protocol 1
(A1-P1). See James & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Feb. 1986, § 46, Ser. A no. 98 (holding that
States enjoy a “wide margin of appreciation” in determining the “public interest” in relation to ex-
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“wide” (more deferential) margin. By contrast, the Court has afforded only
a “narrow” margin in cases implicating an intimate aspect of an individual’s private life.108
Moreover, the margin varies over time. The Court augments the size of
the member states’ margin of appreciation under certain conditions. Most
famously, the Court will readjust the breadth of the margin as regards a
particular right in view of a new consensus among the member states as to
the meaning or scope of the right in question.109 The Court takes a very
broad view of the term “consensus” — meaning really “almostconsensus,” or even “emerging consensus,” which need not actually include the respondent state in the case at hand.110
Similarly, the Court has proven willing to revisit the scope of the margin
in view of the convalescence of external rules of international law relating
to the particular issue — a respect the Court has extended not only to other rules of international law binding on the parties to the Convention, but
also to norms binding on only some of them, unratified treaties, treaties
signed by only some of the parties, and even intrinsically nonbinding “soft
law” instruments like declarations issued by the International Labor Orpropriation under A1-P1).
108. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 22 Oct. 1981, § 52, Ser. A no. 45 (noting in the context of
Northern Ireland’s criminalization of forms of sexual conduct between consenting adult males, the
State is indeed entitled to some margin of appreciation as regards public morals, but that “[t]he present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life” and that “[a]ccordingly, there must exist
particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities can be legitimate . . . .”).
109. See Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 Nov. 1984, § 40, Ser. A no. 87 (“The scope of the margin of
appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background; in this
respect, one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States . . . .”).
110. In Christine Goodwin, for example, the Court recognized that Article 8 (respect for a private
life) may generally entail a wide margin of appreciation, but found that margin defeated in this case
on the basis of changing international trends, despite the manifest lack of any clear consensus within
Europe. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 85, ECHR 2002-VI (“The
Court accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach
to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.”); see Arato,
supra note 14, at 336–37 (examining the Court’s expansive approach to the doctrine of European
consensus); see also Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence Under Special Regimes Relating to Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice: Second Report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over Time, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 210, 255–59 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013). But see A, B, & C v. Ireland [GC], no.
25579/05, §§ 233–37, ECHR 2010 (affording Ireland a wide margin of appreciation in its decision to
prohibit abortion in the vast majority of cases despite acknowledging the existence of a clear European consensus to the effect that the right to a private life (Article 8) requires less interference with
the right to terminate a pregnancy. The Court emphasized, in particular, “the acute sensitivity of the
moral and ethical issues raised by the question of abortion,” and the lack of consensus as to the
specific question of when life begins). Evidently, the application of the margin is not just variable but
largely discretionary, and entails, as Benvenisti notes, no small measure of “judicial politics.” See
Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 846.
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ganization.111 As with identifying consensus, the Court leaves itself significant leeway.
Thus the margin of appreciation cannot be properly understood in the
abstract. It is not a static doctrine, but an inherently dynamic device that
twists and turns through the case law over time. It allows the Court to ensure that the Convention remains responsive to material changes in the
legal, political, and social circumstances of greater Europe and beyond.
The margin of appreciation must thus be understood in light of the central fact that the ECtHR views itself as the steward of human rights in
Europe — charged with overseeing 47 countries, widely diverse in social,
economic, legal, and political character.
In sum, as a doctrine of deference, the margin reflects a commitment to
subsidiarity. That is, an understanding that the states are the primary guarantors of human rights in Europe, and that the Court should defer to national authorities in areas where they will be more competent (e.g., as regards societal mores or the determination of appropriate responses to a
public emergency). The doctrine further reflects a respect for cultural diversity, acknowledging that such different societies as comprise the ECHR
membership may legitimately structure and balance their rights protection
in different ways;112 it represents an acknowledgement that there are not
always right answers, though of course some answers will always be wrong.
But at the same time, the doctrine is dynamic and responsive — reflecting
the idea that things change over time, and the minimum threshold of
rights protection (or, conversely, the appropriate width of the margin) may
adapt and evolve in response.
Viewed on a case-by-case basis, the margin may seem just as arbitrary in
the ECtHR as it does in the investment regime.113 But the doctrine’s success lies precisely in the fact that the Court is charged with the adjudication
of complaints under the Convention on a standing basis. Although the
111. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, no. 34503/97, ECHR 2008 (narrowing the margin with respect
to labor rights under Article 11 on the basis of changing external norms of international law under
the auspices of the ILO); see Julian Arato, Constitutional Transformation in the ECtHR: Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse to External Rules of International Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349, 371 (2012) (examining the
Court’s willingness to expand rights protection in light of a broad array of external norms, ranging
from international law norms binding on the parties to the ECHR to explicitly non-binding soft law).
112. As Benvenisti notes, this doctrine thus entails a principled moral relativism that is difficult to
square with the universalism inherent in the very idea of human rights. See Benvenisti, supra note 13,
at 844. Benvenisti rightly suggests that it is difficult to explain the Court’s recourse to the margin
without at least in part recognizing the driving force of “judicial politics.” Id. at 846. This Article
takes no position as to whether the margin is ultimately desirable in the context of international
human rights adjudication. The point here is only to demonstrate why it works in the context of the
ECHR — i.e., why it produces (relatively) coherent and sensible jurisprudence, whatever we may
think of the outcomes, by contrast to the present (and likely future) arising out of its import into
international investment arbitration.
113. See Tallent, supra note 49; Vasani, supra note 49.
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margin contains no particular degree of deference in the abstract, the degree of deference entailed gets fleshed out over the long term, through the
case law of the Court. And while the degree can change, it tends to shift
through coordinated and relatively well-known ways. Even at home, the
margin of appreciation certainly has its critics;114 but at least there these
three words reflect a coherent doctrine.

III. DEFERENCE AND DIALOGUE
Variable deference may be appropriate in the context of the ECtHR,
where the rationales of subsidiarity, inter-cultural sensitivity, and intertemporal flexibility make sense and can actually be vindicated. But all this
works because the regime entails a single court, charged with the adjudication of disputes against a stable set of parties under a single treaty. Certainty and coherence arise out of case law, and the case law is explicitly
responsive to changes of view among the parties. This kind of doctrine
works less well in the context of ad hoc dispute resolution.
International investment law lacks any centralized system for ensuring
jurisprudential consistency, any notion of formal precedent, or even consistent adjudicators. The system — such as it is — is even fragmented at its
roots, arising out of myriad discrete treaties, with an infinite diversity of
parties. Interpretation of these treaties occurs ad hoc, each time on a oneoff basis. In this setting, the idea of a flexible margin of appreciation connotes little more than a pseudo-standard. It does no analytical work beyond merely acknowledging that some degree of deference is due. The
structure of the regime makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a purposefully variable standard to develop a rich and dynamic structure through
case law.
The comparison between these regimes helps to illuminate the deep
structural problem with importing the margin of appreciation into investment arbitration. A review of the investment cases already gives rise to an
intuition that something is wrong. It seems strange and potentially misleading that applications of the supposedly same doctrine can give rise to such
varied standards of review in different, but not altogether dissimilar cases:
requiring an LRM analysis here, a reasonableness review there, or a mere
rational basis test in a third case.115 But the problem is not just the fact of
114. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 13.
115. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008)
(engaging in LRM review); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final
Award (Nov. 12, 2010) (reviewing for reasonableness and good faith); Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov.
30, 2012) (reviewing the relevant measure for a rational basis (and good faith)); see also Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008)
(reviewing only for convincing evidence of fraud or material error); Saluka Investments BV (The
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difference. As we have seen, even within the ECtHR, the margin leads to
the application of widely varied standards of review in different cases. Indeed such flexibility is a central feature of the doctrine, and the characteristic most strongly emphasized by those advocating its import into the investment regime. The real problem is that the fragmented investment regime lacks the institutional capacity to coordinate the application of this
elastic doctrine over time; here the margin of appreciation tends to produce difference without reason.
The problem of interpretive cacophony on the question of the standard
of review is significant. There is no doubt that the growing uncertainty in
this important area, and the increased awareness of such uncertainty, undermines the credibility of the system. But the invocation of the margin
by scholars and tribunals reflects the wrong approach to resolving this perennial problem in the diffuse investment regime. The attempt to solve the
problem a priori, through judicial recourse to an open-textured doctrine
sufficiently flexible as to accommodate all kinds of different situations, is
set up to fail in a system lacking any unified judicial body capable of
streamlining its meaning and contours over time. Absent such institutional
unity, the margin of appreciation and other doctrines like it will create
more uncertainty than they resolve.
In this decentralized regime, the better path to interpretive coherence is
the slow road of judicial dialogue across tribunals over the long term. Dialogue among ad hoc tribunals is central to the coherence, certainty, and development of international investment law over time — and this centrality
is due precisely to the structural fragmentation of the regime belabored
above. Absent a unified, hierarchical judicial system, and absent any generally accepted notion of formal precedent (in the sense of stare decisis), the
vague and varied standards of treatment in investment treaties get worked
out only gradually, as tribunals rely on or distinguish one another’s interpretations. This path is equally open to attaining greater coherence in approaches to the standard of review, even if the process promises only
gradual results.
Most standards are indeterminate in international investment law. Investment treaties contain myriad formulations of broad standards of
treatment like FET, or the obligation to refrain from indirect expropriation. Despite marked differences in their phrasings, and even in view of
widely varied interpretations by different tribunals, few believe that these
standards are today impossibly uncertain.116 At least at their cores, these
Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006).
116. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 134–39 (recounting the long debate among tribunals as to the scope of FET provisions, broadly over whether they merely incorporate the supposedly
restrictive international minimum standard of treatment under customary international law, or
whether FET clauses entailed a more robust standard autonomous from customary international

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2319559

2014]

THE MARGIN IN INVESTMENT LAW

573

standards are relatively stable. But they were not built in a day; rather, these
standards have convalesced over time through arbitral practice informed
by prior case law. To be sure, there are conflicting lines of jurisprudence,
often — but not always — relating to the outer boundaries of these concepts.117 But conflict and disagreement are essential motors in the process,
so long as they are well reasoned rather than papered over. Distinguishing
past cases is as valuable a mechanism of judicial dialogue as relying on
them. And where the law appears truly in flux, as with standards of review,
the best answer is often to wait and see — to wait for tribunals to come to
conclusions, test approaches, and compare their views with whatever disparate authorities are available.118
Thus the fact that tribunals employ different standards of review in different cases is not necessarily a problem at all. There may have been perfectly good reasons to apply a more searching LRM test in reviewing the
state’s emergency measures in Continental Casualty and a mere rational basis
test in determining whether the state was within its rights to reintroduce
administrative pricing in Electrabel. But even in more similar cases the fact
of differences in result is not necessarily a bad thing. It is not necessarily
problematic that the tribunals in Electrabel and Saluka resorted to different
standards of review in assessing whether their respective respondents’ regulatory actions were non-compensable exercises of the states’ police powers; if adequately explained, the fact that one engaged in rational basis review while the other considered a more deferential approach appropriate
could help illuminate methodological possibilities as well as the relevant
stakes for future disputes, and thereby prompt greater critical reflection
going forward. But everything turns on reasoning. Difference can only be
law). Dolzer and Schreuer note that over time extreme divergence among tribunals on this issue has
given way to “growing doubts about the relevance of the whole debate.” Id. at 138. Most scholars
now tend to acknowledge that FET provisions must at least be interpreted in light of customary
international law, but at the same time, that the law on the protection of aliens under customary
international law has evolved into something more robust than the international minimum standard
of the early twentieth century. See MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013).
117. For example, tribunals have come to opposite conclusions in interpreting whether the most
favored nation clause of the same treaty, the Germany—Argentina BIT, applies only to substantive
protections or also allows importation of more favorable procedural protections found in other BITs.
Compare Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 102–03, 120–21 (Aug. 3, 2004) (allowing importation of the more favorable procedural structure
of the Argentina—Chile BIT, to avoid having to comply with a requirement under the Germany—
Argentina BIT to litigate in domestic court for eighteen months before going to arbitration) with
Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22,
2012) (holding, on exactly the same issue, that the most favored nation provision of the treaty does
not allow recourse to more favorable procedural provisions in external treaties, and thus disclaiming
jurisdiction).
118. Admittedly this answer may not satisfy litigants in particular cases, but it will likely not surprise anyone either — at least not those with experience within the investor-state arbitral system.
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productive where reasons are given. As things stand, the tribunals in
Electrabel and Saluka grounded their choices about the standard of review
in only abstract invocations of the margin of appreciation in lieu of any
real reasoning — as a consequence, their differences in result appear more
or less random.
This concept of dialogue should thus not be equated with the separate
idea of de facto precedent in international investment law. Some have emphasized the fact that tribunals do (and should) rely on one another’s opinions, not just as a matter of practical reasoning but on the further theory
that such opinions should be entitled to some presumptive weight. This
view is especially associated with the prolific arbitrator and publicist Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler; as arbitrator, she has ensured the inclusion of a
paragraph formalizing the idea in several awards. As framed in Saipem v.
Bangladesh:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions.
At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that,
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that,
subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances
of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.119
By contrast, I do not mean to suggest that prior awards need necessarily
be afforded any precedential weight. The point is rather that tribunals ought
to draw from previous awards in working out their answers where doing so
is helpful. Whether or not tribunals grant authoritative weight to past decisions because they are past decisions is distinct from, and arguably less important than, the idea that they should rely on prior awards on the basis of
strength of reasoning.
My negative claim is thus that we should avoid turning to broad allencompassing approaches in seeking to attain greater coherence as regards
119. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 90
(June 30, 2009). This paragraph has become a hallmark of Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and appears
often among the many disputes chaired or decided by this prolific arbitrator. See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. v.
Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 46 (Sept. 27,
2012) (repeating practically verbatim the above paragraph from Saipem S.p.A.); see also Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 378 (2007); J. P.
Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Empirical Backing, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT.,
Sept.
2007,
at
6,
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=
1064. But see Brigitte Stern’s separate statement in Quiborax, indicating that she “does not analyze the
arbitrator’s role in the same manner, as she considers it her duty to decide each case on its own merits, independently of any apparent jurisprudential trend.” Quiborax, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, ¶ 46.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2319559

2014]

THE MARGIN IN INVESTMENT LAW

575

the standard of review. Recourse to malleable a priori doctrines not found
in the treaties runs the risk of undermining dialogue over time, by substituting abstract recitations for real reasoning, and thereby obscuring difference and disagreement. My positive claim is that we can and should count
on the process of dialogue to work out the answers in the long term. This
means that tribunals ought to simply do their best to determine the right
standards in particular cases, in light of (but not necessarily in reliance on)
other cases. Of course they need not shy away from deviating from past
cases or case lines, even on similar issues, where there appears good reason
to do so. But they should above all be very clear in explaining their choices.
The system privileges, and indeed necessitates, clarity. In international investment law, an award should be only as persuasive as its reasoning.
A final point bears noting. None of this is to say that the jurisprudence
of other international courts and tribunals like the ECtHR bears no relevance to judicial reasoning in international investment arbitration. Dialogue need not be confined among investor-state tribunals. As Schill forcefully argues, the judgments of other international courts and tribunals provide a valuable repertoire of practice from which arbitrators can draw insight and inspiration — including the rich case law of the ECtHR.120 The
same arguably applies to drawing from the reasoning of national courts as
they grapple with similar questions in various contexts.121 Although, as I
have argued above, it may be imprudent to try to resolve the problem of
standards of review in investment law by lifting a complex, overarching
doctrine from a very different standing court, there may be good reason to
rely on more precise elements of such a court’s reasoning in particular cases.122
Even as regards the specific issue of determining the appropriate standard of review, several investor-state tribunals have drawn important insights from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR without having recourse to
120. Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law — An Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (Stephan W. Schill ed.,
2010).
121. Id.; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 392 (2012). But see PAPARINSKIS, supra note 116, at 19–20, 172–74, 255–56 (voicing healthy
skepticism of analogies to domestic public law in the interpretation of standards of treatment in
international investment treaties).
122. As Jeremy Waldron forcefully notes, arguing mutatis mutandis for the invocation of foreign
law by U.S. courts, there is a deep value in examining how others have worked out similar problems
in similar contexts — as a matter of practical reasoning, falling short of any kind of doctrine of stare
decisis. JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN
AMERICAN COURTS 76 (2012) (pursuing two main lines of arguments: first “that we can learn from
what other courts are doing when they address questions which are the same or similar to those we
are addressing”; and second “the more challenging idea that there may be some virtue in sheer consistency across the decisions of different courts, even for courts belonging to different jurisdictions.”).
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the doctrine of the margin of appreciation per se. For example, in determining how much deference to afford the respondent in Tecmed v. Mexico,
the Tribunal famously determined that the appropriate standard would be
review for proportionality.123 However, the Tribunal drew important inspiration from the ECtHR in tailoring its proportionality test. The Tribunal
noted with approval the European Court’s finding in James v. United Kingdom
that a state should be entitled to a less lenient version of proportionality
review where, as in Tecmed (and all investor-state arbitration), the state interferes with the property rights of a non-national.124 The Tribunal emphasized the ECtHR’s reasoning that:
[N]on-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or
designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption.
Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in
the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than
non-nationals.125
Whether or not we approve of the ECtHR’s argument in James, the
Tecmed Tribunal’s use of that argument reflects the right kind of approach
to judicial borrowing — based on reasoning rather than abstract doctrines.
The Tecmed Tribunal drew from James because it provided guidance on the
specific question of what kind of deference should be afforded a sovereign state in its treatment of foreigners — not because it embodied a convenient and generalizable abstract principle of deference. And indeed, these ideas have since found favor with subsequent investor-state tribunals.126
Thus the case law of the ECtHR may have an important role to play as
tribunals work out how state action ought to be reviewed in different kinds
of investment cases. Advocates of the margin of appreciation approach
123. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003).
124. Id.
125. James & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Feb. 1986, § 63, Ser. A no 98, quoted in Tecmed, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122.
126. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 312–
13 (July 14, 2006) (citing Tecmed and James and finding that “these additional elements provide useful
guidance for purposes of determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory”). Indeed
we see this kind of borrowing from the ECtHR frequently, as for example in Saipem S.p.A., where the
Tribunal relied on ECtHR jurisprudence in establishing the principle, discussed above, that the setting-aside of or refusal to enforce a commercial arbitral award by a host state’s national courts can
qualify as a judicial expropriation in violation of an investor’s BIT rights. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s
Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 130 (June 30, 2009) (relying heavily
on the Court’s reasoning that a commercial award can count as a “possession” within the meaning of
the right to property under the ECHR, so long as the award is final and binding) (quoting and discussing Stran Greek Refineries & Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 9 Dec. 1994, Ser. A no. 301-B).
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are absolutely right, at least, in highlighting the value of that court’s extensive jurisprudence toward working out the answers across a wide variety of
different circumstances. While adopting the margin of appreciation doctrine wholesale is the wrong way to go, there is still much to be gained
from looking at how the ECtHR applies the margin in specific cases.

CONCLUSION
In the absence of a system of appeal or formal precedent, the holdings
of an arbitral award are only as persuasive as their underlying reasoning.
But as I hope to have shown, this is just where the margin of appreciation
falls short as a doctrine. In investment arbitration, the margin tends to be
invoked to justify determinations of the standard of review without any
substantive explanation of why a particular standard reflects the appropriate degree of deference in a particular context. In each of the cases analyzed, the margin has appeared to yield completely different standards of
review; yet we, and future tribunals, are left with little impression as to why.
From a reading of Continental Casualty v. Argentina and Frontier Petroleum v.
Czech Republic, it seems as if LRM or reasonableness review simply follow
inexorably from the notion of the margin.127 The same can be said of
Saluka v. Czech Republic and its review for clear and compelling evidence of
error or improper conduct or the review for convincing evidence of fraud
or material error in Micula v. Romania; and Electrabel v. Hungary is even more
opaque.128 Nothing about the margin of appreciation as a doctrine illuminates these variations, nor is any other reasoning presented. The doctrine
is, in other words, employed more or less as a cheap substitute for any
analysis of the deepest questions: in the face of treaty silence, what standard or standards of review are appropriate in investor-state arbitration?
Under what conditions? And for what reasons?
At the same time, the false impression of consistency across cases like
Continental Casualty, Frontier Petroleum, Electrabel, Saluka, and Micula, runs the
risk of compounding itself in the future. If such cases are viewed as unproblematic instantiations of tribunals’ application of a single doctrine,
127. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008)
(applying a searching LRM analysis); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010) (reviewing for reasonableness and good faith).
128. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
¶ 273 (Mar. 17, 2006); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008). Electrabel applies the margin of appreciation in two instances and in
seemingly different ways. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35 (Nov. 30, 2012). The Tribunal
afforded Hungary a “reasonable margin of appreciation,” again without articulating any particular
test under such rubric, or differentiating between a “reasonable” and “modest” margin. Id. ¶ 8.35.
And it also granted the State a “modest margin of appreciation,” without explaining whether and
how that might differ from a “reasonable” margin. Id. ¶ 6.92.
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they risk muddying the analysis in future disputes. The cases we have thus
far have come out differently on the key questions, with no explanation as
to why. If we pretend that these are all simply applications of a single doctrine, the capacity for confusion and uncertainty will prove staggering.
Thus the import of the margin of appreciation into international investment law does active harm. Absent institutional centralization, the invocation of this open-ended doctrine tends to obstruct that process of
dialogue essential to working out a more consistent approach to the standard of review over time. This is not necessarily a problem unique to the
margin, but one that the margin produces in an especially severe way. As I
hope to have shown, the problem of interpretive fragmentation concerning the standard of review in international investment law will not be readily resolved through an abstract, a priori doctrine, no matter how flexible.
The better road is, here, the harder road — unity through well-reasoned
arbitral practice and judicial dialogue. If this approach abstains from trying
to resolve the problem of fragmented approaches to the standard of review in the short run, the reward will be a more coherent, certain, and legitimate approach in the medium to long term.
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